

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

(19 June 1950)

by

Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert

GENERAL BULL: Gentlemen: For this final lecture by the Service Secretaries, it is my special pleasure this morning to present to you the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, the Honorable Eugene M. Zuckert, who will talk to us on the problems and the policies of the Air Force. Mr. Zuckert.

SECRETARY ZUCKERT: General Bull and gentlemen: It is indeed an honor for an Assistant Secretary to attend to this assignment. As you know, Mr. Finletter has only recently taken over the job of Secret of the Air Force and Mr. McCone, the Under Secretary, was sworn in last week. I guess they figured that having been with the Air Force for something over four years that should at least indicate some nominal qualification to speak to this distinguished group.

As I told General Bull coming up here, I never thought they would get me on this side of the aisle. For the last couple of years I have attended many, many of your lectures; it has been my privilege sit on that side and to admire the distinguished speakers you get, as as the high caliber of the questions afterwards. Any tribute to the National War College from me would be unnecessary, but I join in the universal admiration for the job that is being done here.

I try to be frank with my audiences and I will say that this speech is somewhat of an international proposition. It was worked up

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about three weeks ago before I took off for Europe, Saudi Arabia, and related spots. Meanwhile, there seem to have been some speakers who made some comments -- some inconsistent with what I say, some not. As I told General Bull, I have a speech; and then I have some comment on the speech.

About this time last year, the Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Symington, appeared on this platform and outlined ten elements of international situation -- and of our national policy -- which, in his opinion, were the chief considerations underlying Air Force policy.

Since that appearance a year ago, two events of deep strategic significance have taken place. Therefore, in my remarks this morning, I shall first recapitulate the ten broad factors discussed here last year and then discuss those two strategically significant events against the background of those ten broad factors.

As outlined here last year, the ten broad factors affecting Air Force policy were:

First, our so-called "traditional" national policy of political and economic isolationism has been abandoned.

Second, our traditional dependence on ocean and polar barriers must yield to the necessity for military readiness.

Third, there exists only one current source of military threat to our national security, instead of multiple sources as in the past. This current military threat is quite different from the one we last faced; and therefore, we must be sure that the military means we develop

are designed to meet the new threat, and not the old one.

Fourth, our resources -- both man power and material -- are not unlimited; hence they must be husbanded, lest we squander our children's heritage.

Fifth, the military forces of Democracy are numerically inferior to the military forces of Communism; therefore, the military forces of Democracy must attain and maintain qualitative -- technological superiority.

Sixth, our military establishment must be designed to prove early decisive action by the enemy, and to destroy the sources of his military power.

Seventh, modern war is fought on four major fronts -- diplomatic, economic, psychological and military. Military strength is essential, the role of the military nevertheless is distinctly limited.

Eighth, in the process of preparing to defeat a regimented enemy we must not ourselves surrender to regimentation.

Ninth, we must develop, and maintain, adequate military strength without committing economic suicide.

And tenth, we are in the midst of a battle for the minds of the world; and in such a battle, the only "absolute weapon" is TRUTH.

The two strategically significant events, with which you are familiar, were:

First, the passage last fall of legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. This legislation officially marked the end of the traditional military isolationism of the United States. Our traditional political isolationism

had already ended with the United Nations Charter; and our traditional economic isolationism had ended with the Marshall Plan. Now, today, our commitment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program makes our military establishment responsible for participation in the collective defense of the Atlantic Pact nations, in addition to its traditional responsibility for the defense of the United States, its territories and possessions.

The second event of deep strategic significance, of course, was the President's announcement last fall that a foreign nation had achieved an atomic explosion.

It is self-evident that both of these events have had a strong impact on our foreign policy. It is obvious that the task of our military services must contribute to attainment of our over-all national objectives, particularly our over-all national objectives as expressed in our foreign policy. In order to view the Air Force task in proper perspective, it therefore becomes necessary first to examine the over-all national objective from which the task is derived.

The national objective of the United States is peace, attained through establishment of an orderly world society in which all nations live together amicably under a regime of law which recognizes that reason and not force should govern the world. As a practical matter, therefore, our national objective is establishment of a world organization having police power capable of enforcing prohibition against war itself.

At present, the organization exists, but the regime of law has not been established; and the organization would be incapable of enforcing the law even if the law had been established. The effort has been and

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still being made, but rebuffed. It is unnecessary to elaborate on the source of rebuff. One has only to analyze what has happened in the United Nations -- its Military Staff Committee, Commission for Conventional Armaments, and Atomic Energy Committee.

It is self-evident that our desire to live in a world governed by law and not force is not universally shared. Reluctantly, therefore the United States has been driven into a position calling for a double barreled foreign policy which at first blush might appear anomalous in that, although our national objective is peace, we nevertheless are dedicating a large share of our national resources to preparation against the possibility of war. The anomaly is explained, however, by our conviction that adequate preparation for defense is, in itself, the greatest deterrent to war. Secretary Finletter stated in a speech at the University of Pennsylvania last week, "The primary purpose of our defense establishment is to have in being, and ready for immediate action, a force so strong that it will stand as a compelling deterrent to a nation which would break the peace."

Bearing in mind that both barrels of this double-barreled foreign policy are mounted on the same gun, and that the gun is aimed at just one target -- world peace -- let us now consider the barrel which is loaded in part with military air power. For convenience, let us call it the "Defense Barrel".

As already mentioned, our defense concept now and in the future is no longer limited to protection of the continental United States. Already, the United States has made a 180 degree turn away from its traditional isolationism. As the distinguished Chairman of the Senate Armed

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Services Committee, Senator Tydings, said in a speech last year:

"Whether we like it or not, Time, Destiny, and the Will of God, have made us the leader in the coming contest for the survival of civilization. We must be international minded enough to meet this challenge. If we wear the blinkers of isolationism in this modern day, we are doing nothing more than refusing to see our eventual, inevitable destruction."

Through the North Atlantic Pact and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, we have made common cause with other nations for the protection of Western society. Our task is the defense of freedom.

This Defense Barrel is loaded with a compound charge -- a charge compounded of economic-social and politico-military elements. In order to be an effective charge, those elements must fuse and work together.

The aim of our economic-social policies is to establish the preconditions necessary to achieve the objectives of our politico-military policies -- the latter expressed in the North Atlantic Pact and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. These politico-military agreements bind the Atlantic nations together for collective security; but they also recognize the fact that, without the military strength to back it up, a pact or agreement is little more than a pious wish.

This is the new commitment which makes the defense policy of the United States so different from that of the past. Our defense policy must now take into account our commitment to come to the defense of those who have joined with us in common cause. And it goes without saying that the politico-military developments of the Atlantic Pact and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, as they affect the defense policies of our allies, must also be taken into account by those allies in the establishment

of their own defense policies. In other words, the defense policy of each member nation of the North Atlantic Pact must be consistent with the common defense policy of the whole.

The detailed development of the defense policy of the Atlantic nations as a whole is still in process; therefore, it is hardly a proper subject of discussion at this time. One underlying principle, however, has been emphasized by General Bradley, when he recently spoke about the impossibility of providing each member nation with a self-sufficient military establishment. The underlying principle, as General Bradley pointed out, must be that of collective security, with each member nation specializing in the development of those military forces which it is best able to contribute. The same underlying principle was confirmed and underscored by Secretary of State Acheson a few weeks ago, when he reported to Congress on the results of the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers in London and Paris.

In essence, that principle of collective action as distinguished from individual self-sufficiency is also the underlying principle of a Unification Act, as I see it.

It is unnecessary to spell out the reasons why the defense strategy of the Atlantic nations must be founded on the military power of the United States. It follows that the defense policy of the North Atlantic Pact nations as a whole must take into account the traditional national policy of the United States never to initiate war. Applied to the present situation, exactly what does that traditional national policy mean? Does it mean that the United States intends to sit and wait for

the enemy's attack, and then try to get up from the floor and win the fight by exerting our superior mobilization potential -- which, incidentally, we believe is several times the mobilization potential of Russia?

In my opinion, the answer is "No". But the alternative is to instigate preventive war. As I see it, the alternative is to have being a force that would be clearly capable of quickly stopping the early attack -- and clearly capable of knocking him down and holding him down until we are able to bring our greater mobilized forces and those of our allies into the battle for ultimate victory.

It is our belief that the existence of such a Force In Being clearly evident to the potential enemy, will deter him from attacking. This is the kind of force that acts to prevent war, because it makes an unprofitable venture for the aggressor. Therefore, this is the kind of force that is consistent with our national objective of a free and peaceful world, in which war is effectively outlawed.

But, you say, how does the existence of such a Force In Being contribute to the security of the nations of Western Europe? How can it protect those nations from being overrun during the early period of hostilities? Unless this Force In Being can act promptly and directly to protect the nations of Western Europe as well as the United States, how can its maintenance be consistent with the defense policy of the Atlantic Pact nations as a whole?

Those are good questions, and I hope I have a good answer. To me, the answer is that the core of the military power of the North Atlantic community of nations is the war-making capacity of the United

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and by the term "war-making capacity" I mean the capacity to support forces -- both our own and those of our allies -- which might be required to win the ultimate military decision. The war-making capacity of the United States was the deciding factor in the last two world wars, and would be the deciding factor in the next. Therefore, the protection of that war-making capacity is essential to the collective security of the North Atlantic nations. As such, it constitutes a first charge on the military resources of the Atlantic nations.

I am sure you recognize the utter impossibility of having ultimate mobilized forces in being prior to the outset of hostilities.

I am equally sure, however, that you recognize the new and cardinal fact which changes all the rules and requires a new and different strategy for the defense of this nation, and for the collective alliance security of the Atlantic Pact nations. The new and cardinal fact is that for the first time in the history of the United States, a potential enemy can soon possess the means to destroy the war-making capacity of the United States at the very outset of hostilities, unless his attack is effectively countered.

Let there be no mistake about it -- the war-making capacity of the United States is becoming increasingly vulnerable to enemy atomic attack which, if not effectively countered, could blot out the principal source of support for democratic forces world-wide.

Effective defense of the whole North Atlantic community of nations, therefore, requires effective defense of the productivity of the continental United States against attack by the enemy's atomic force.

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Perhaps I am unduly optimistic, but I am hopeful that further examination of our strategic plans in the light of the atomic explosion in Russia will produce agreement on the overriding priority of this and greater recognition of the contribution each of the three services can make in carrying it out. Real, specific agreement on relative priority of specific tasks would, in my opinion, greatly increase the effectiveness of joint forces.

I suggest that this matter of priorities is the heart of the defense planning problem; and that each service should subject itself to a most searching self-examination to make sure that it is observing the priorities in its estimates of force requirements. In unilateral service planning, and in joint staff planning, and in combined staff planning employment of the military strength of the North Atlantic nations as a whole it seems to me essential that the priority task of protecting the war-making capacity of the United States be clearly recognized. We should insist on it in our discussions with our allies.

Thus we arrive at the conclusion that Air Force policy looking toward optimum military provision for our national security -- as well as the collective security of the Atlantic Pact nations -- must be directed toward utmost protection of the war-making capacity of the United States against atomic attack. And further, it behooves the Air Force to seek maximum assistance from any and all sources in the accomplishment of its share of this task.

In this connection, it is very important to make a clear distinction between tasks which require D-day forces, and tasks which would be accomplished

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by the so-called mobilized forces in later stages of the war. Here again we must be very careful to adhere strictly to relative priority of important tasks. Our prewar mobilization resources are so limited that we cannot to jeopardize vital initial operations by allocating a disproportionate amount of our premobilization resources to projects that have to do mainly with operations that could not take place until later.

In all of the foregoing, I have tried to indicate my impression of the relationship between our military policy and our foreign policy, the relationship between this military and foreign policy and the national objectives of the United States as well as the over-all objectives of the North Atlantic community of nations; the strategic focus which I consider necessary in view of the enemy's possession of atomic weapons and the need to deliver them; the reasons why I believe this strategic focus makes sense to our allies, even though on the surface it might not appear to satisfy their immediate concern over the threat of land invasions; and the urgent necessity of prompt agreement on relative priority of major military tasks.

I believe our strategy is sound, and I further believe we can and will carry it out, provided we observe the underlying principle of collective action for collective security, both within our own defense establishment and within the combined military establishment of the North Atlantic community as a whole.

Now, that is my speech. I thought as I read it again, on coming back here, what I would think of it if I were sitting in your shoes. My criticism of it would be it is much too general; that it isn't related to specific air force problems about which may be you expected to hear

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discussion in some detail. I would like to talk for a few minutes to this generality, and to indicate to you some of the things which I believe as a result of sitting over in the Pentagon for something over years,

In a relatively few moments, in that speech, I have discussed many broad undertakings and implied many others. For example, I talked about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I talked about military assistance. I implied some things about our own economic assistance. And I talked about the development of our own military priorities and allocation of military resources. The thing that impresses me most is any one of these problems, by itself, would be sufficient to challenge intellect, courage, and stamina of the ablest men.

What we are really talking about today is the attempt of this nation to learn the techniques of survival in an absolutely new kind of world. The complexity of each of these problems by itself is to me tremendously impressive. When you attempt to interrelate them, you get a picture such as we see today, which offers the greatest challenge any nation could ever have. It becomes even more impressive, I believe, when you consider that we are only ten years -- less than ten years -- removed from the Presidential campaign of 1940 -- a campaign which reflected, I believe, the intense isolationism that the country had at that time.

To me it seems amazing that in ten years this country could have come so far so fast. The big question, of course, is whether ten years is long enough. Ten years -- looking at it from the secure seat in the grandstand in history -- isn't a very long time for a nation to adapt i

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to such a change in conditions. Maybe we haven't come far enough in a unification process to be able successfully to fight a war tomorrow. we could fight one successfully in three years or five years. Your own judgment on that might be different from mine. Maybe, because of the of nation we are, we haven't learned to adapt ourselves to the kind of struggle we are in; so if war comes in twenty-five years it would be too late for what we have to do.

The important thing, I think, is the fact that the pattern of decision which is being made today in our foreign policy and in our military policy, in our economic-social policy, is realistic in its trend. For our economic-social problem finds expression in the work of the Economic Social Council of the United Nations and in the Marshall Plan. Through these activities we are attempting to firm up an economic base and create a social environment conducive to unity in the Western European community of nations. These policies, as Mr. Acheson has said, stem from fear of economic insecurity and fear of friction brought about by social injustices forces which cannot be artificially contained in a world as small as ours.

How about our foreign policy? From time to time you hear complaints to the effect that the foreign policy of the United States is not clearly defined, that we drift along in the current of international events and extemporize our policy as we drift. I get the impression that these complaints come from individuals who consider it the duty of our governmental leaders to prescribe our foreign policy in the form of axioms and corollaries, instead of as fiat from on high. I dare say such complaints will never end, because the foreign policy of a free people cannot be made that way. American

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policy springs from the common impulse, the will of the American people. It develops point by point into a discernible, describable, cohesive whole. Its process of development resembles the process of making Law as described by Mr. Justice Holmes -- not by fiat from on high, not from documents emanating from one or many sources, but by a continuing series of pin-point decisions guided by the impulses of free thought in a free society, which at any given time forms the complex called Law.

The pin-point decisions on questions of foreign policy which this nation has made and is making do form an orderly pattern, and they reflect the conflicts and expressions of the American people in the daily struggle for freedom and the better life, not only for the American people but for the rest of the world. These seem to me the basic considerations which motivate us in the Air Force today.

Our topical discussions with which we are involved tend to be about relatively minor breakdowns of our big job. For example, in the field of military policy, you might have liked to hear me talk about the proper division of \$13 billion among the services. I don't believe, so long as the underlying pattern of unification persists, that is a proper discussion. I think it is much more profitable to examine the question whether we have the machinery, are we tending to determine what is required to do the essential job, and then whether or not we can develop those things at their minimum cost? We can talk, for example, about the organization of the Air Force; we can talk about the role of the organization of the Air Force in unification; but these things to me seem subordinate as long as we are progressing along a line such as I have outlined in the main part of my speech.

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Part of this demand for being specific seems to me to stem from the inevitable frustrations of being in a cold war. This preventive war which we hear, which I think Secretary Acheson effectively killed last year, is attempting to find an outlet -- "Let's do something!" Part of the problem of this thing is the fact that there really isn't anything you can do quickly.

Our job in the armed forces and in the Air Force is to provide necessary measures of military security while this country gropes its way through the intricate job of exploring the possibility of assuming the offensive in this momentous world struggle. If you can't envisage some time in the future when, by some technique, we can assume the offensive, then I think the discussion of military security is profitless. I think the pattern, the underlying pattern that we have discussed today, of our foreign policy, our economic-social policy and our military policy, through the process of unification that we are on the road toward gaining the maximum measure of security possible. Thank you.

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Discussion following Lecture

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Secretary of the Air Force

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GENERAL OWEN: The Secretary is ready for your questions.

COLONEL SPART: Mr. Secretary, this is a little far afield from your talk, but I think we will be interested in hearing of your visit to Saudi Arabia. Can you tell us what negotiations are under way, or what success we are having in retaining our airfield interest in that part of the world?

SECRETARY ZUCKERT: Well, I was only briefly in Saudi Arabia while they whipped up a little sandstorm just so I wouldn't get any wrong ideas. I suspected General O'Keefe of having big electric blowers out there sending it through.

On the base-rights situation, we have obtained a temporary extension now. The problem, as in most places in the world, is tied up with this problem of what is the United States willing to do in regard to assistance. It is the old quid pro quo program. I didn't see Ibn Sa'ud. He is quite friendly to Americans. In fact, Americans are about the only people he trusts. From the friendship point of view, it looks as if we will eventually work out an agreement; but he isn't going to give easily as long as it looks as if there is a possibility of his getting something substantial for Saudi Arabia from the standpoint of military assistance.

MR. PETERSON: Mr. Secretary, in your talk you mentioned peace as being one of our primary national objectives. I wonder if you would

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comment on this, that perhaps our fundamental national objective is more selfish than a wish to improve the condition of the people, and peace is a condition in which we can attain this end, and it is a condition for realization of our objectives rather than an objective per se.

SECRETARY HUCKERT: I think my only comment on that would be to agree with you in part. But I think even more than that, we consider peace a necessity because peace is the only way in which you can survive. In the technique of war devised, there is no war talking about living in a world where you can't be sure that peace won't exist, because as time goes on, whether it is today, 15 years from now, or 25 years from now, the possibility of being obliterated is always there in the future. And that is why I cite peace as our primary national objective.

CHIEF, BUREAU: Mr. Secretary, if I may follow that question up by another, I wonder whether or not you believe two fundamentally different ideologies can continue to live in a world at peace without a fundamental change occurring in one or the other?

SECRETARY HUCKERT: What you say, "ideologies," you suggest something as being fixed. For instance, the ideology of Russia today as opposed to the ideology of the United States. Well, as long as the ideology of one of them is world conquest, I don't think two such ideologies can exist, two different ones, in the world. Therefore, in order to permit two great nations to exist in the world together, there must be a change in the ideology of the one that believes world conquest is one of their primary motivating forces.

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COLONEL CALDERA: Mr. Secretary, in your talk you indicated the North Atlantic Treaty placed responsibility on the United States, giving priority, probably, to the defense of the United States industrial power. At the same time, as a result of the Exercise Swarmer, we read in the papers where the Air Force is transferring certain fighter units to a tactical air command which you indicated in your speech might be a lower priority requirement to support ground forces. Would you care to comment on the assignment of these fighter units to a tactical air command for a long-range air objective when we might need them for the more immediate air defense of this industrial potential?

SECRETARY ZUCKER: When you are talking about immediate, you are talking about the size Air Force you have got today; you are talking about an Air Force with resources of four and a half billion dollars in annual appropriations. Whether that is the Air Force that is sufficient to permit us to do our job is not specifically answered by the question of how much money we have. In other words, I don't think there is any doubt about it. If you are talking about war in 1952-1953, the four and a half billion dollar Air Force is not sufficient to do the job. When you have only a limited number of forces, I think you have to move them around.

Your question is: "If you move them around, can you put them in support of ground troops rather than in air defense?" I think you have to assume, for the moment anyhow, that we are doing the best we can in the light of the situation we are likely to have to face first. In contrast to that move, emphasizing also this problem of limited resources,

is a proposal to redeploy fighter units and decentralize them in an attempt to strengthen your air defense. When you are working with the limitations that there are upon us and there are on the other services too, in the light of our priorities, you continually have to take half measures.

COLONEL PAXSON: Mr. Secretary, following up again on another favority theme, the priorities as between fighters and B-36s, and the two apparently high priority things, that is retaliation with the B-36 and the defense of these resources which you consider so vital, it seems to me from our studies during the year that within a matter of weeks we will have used up our A-bomb stockpile and that it would not be economical from the long-range view to use conventional bombs with the B-36. Would you care to discuss the change to more fighter defense rather than so many B-36s, that is, building up the four groups?

SECRETARY ZUCKERT: I think the answer to that is if you don't, your fundamental philosophy of the Air Force, as I understand it, is based upon the necessity of getting a sufficient attack upon the target in order to enable you to either deter the Russians or, if they start after you, to strike at the root of their war potential. Your question is, "Why do we emphasize the B-36 rather than fighter defense?"

COLONEL PAXSON: To the extent of four groups as against three or two.

SECRETARY ZUCKERT: It is not my understanding, that a force based upon four groups would exhaust the atomic stockpile.

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CAPTAIN RING: Would you tell us what changes you expect to see in the composition of our Air Force as a result of the greater participation of the European countries in the defense of the Atlantic Pact area, whether that is going to have any impact on the composition of our own forces?

SECRETARY EUGENIE: The fundamental assumption of your question has to be that we still have a military budget and a civilian budget which will go along in accordance with our complete constitution. I think that you would have to generalize. I think under the limited budget we have today the composition of the Air Force is about what it can be, it is not a question of whether it is what it should be. If you are going to speculate, "If we build up the North Atlantic Pact nations, should we have another billion dollars in the Air Force to do more with, and then what would the Air Force look like?" That is a different question. But I haven't seen any indication you are going to get any material increase in dollars for your forces near the United States, for your own military forces. And if that is true I don't see any reasonable change in the composition of the Air Force.

CAPTAIN RING: May I pursue that a little further? According to that, then, it does not seem to me that there is going to be actual change from our goal of balanced forces. I have back to the statement of General Bradley's relative to the necessity for giving up the idea of balanced forces. From what you say, it would seem to me, then, our Air Force must be balanced within itself rather than assume that some other signatories to the Atlantic Pact are going to provide some of the requirements of the Air Force. ~~Thank you.~~

SECRETARY TUCKER: I probably misinterpreted your first statement, but one thing that you are going to do under the Military Defense Assistance Program is provide, for example, air assistance to a country like France. You asked me if there are going to be any remarkable changes, not whether or not there are going to be any significant changes. I said that the job we have to do still exists, that you can't get greater balance because balance has to be based on the jobs we have to do. The Air Force job still exists. We are making attempts, for example, by rotating fighters to Europe. We are potentially putting more fighter aircraft in Europe. But, from the standpoint of what change could we make in the Air Force merely by reason of the Military Defense Assistance Program without having a bigger Air Force, I don't see what changes we could possibly make in the light of the task that we already have.

COLONEL MARTIN: Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to that number one priority task, that of defending, or attempting to secure our own American war potential. In view of the circumstances, we probably will not have any increased appropriations. We really gain a measure of security that will be evident, not only to us, but to the North Atlantic community of nations.

SECRETARY ZUCKER: Your question is, "If we don't get any substantial increase in our own appropriations, aren't we just kidding ourselves?"

COLONEL MARTIN: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY ZUCKER: I would say this -- and I had better start running when I say it -- although we are on the way, I don't think we have yet gotten to the point where we have effectively explored whether or not

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the \$13 billion we have today is being utilized for the accomplishment of the priority tasks. Do I make myself clear? If not, I will put my foot in further.

COLONEL ARTIN: Yes, indeed.

CAPTAIN ANDERSON: Mr. Secretary, from your appraisal of the situation and the costs of Government, and so forth, your recognition of the challenge which we face and the vital position that the United States plays in the world today, do you believe we can meet our responsibilities on a "business as usual" basis, and if not, who is going to tie the bell to the cat?

SECRETARY ZUCKER: Well, as they say in the Pentagon, "I would agree with you in principle". That would be a way of disposing of your question. I will try and take that one on, too. I don't think that you are going to dispose of this problem on a "business as usual, politics as usual" basis. I guess I didn't succeed too well in demonstrating it from my speech; but I, for one, believe we are making progress in and overcoming this "business as usual, politics as usual" approach. And that is why I say I don't think the current problems today are of transcendent importance. I, for one, would have believed it impossible ten years ago, eight years ago, five years ago, that we could have accomplished anything like the Economic Assistance Program. That certainly is not "politics as usual". Although there was a lot of rumbling in the last session of Congress about what they were going to do, they didn't do too much. I, for one, wouldn't have believed from my experience in the Pentagon in the early days of demobilization that this country would support, on a projected basis,

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a military establishment of \$13 billion. I wouldn't have believed we could put over the Military Assistance Program. My own belief, with which you may disagree, is that there is growing consciousness of our obligations, of the dangers in the situation. I wouldn't have believed the three services could have gotten together and in three years made the accomplishments that they have made under unification in getting down and seeing each other's viewpoint and trying to work out the fundamentals of a balanced military force. That is the question in my mind and that is the question on which, I believe, whether we survive or not will be answered.

GENERAL EVLND: General, you appeared to have overcome all the answers to the questions here.

On behalf of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I want to express our sincere appreciation for coming down today and giving us this good, straightforward talk, based on what I know to be a number of hard years in the Pentagon. We appreciate it very much.

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